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SECRET**167**

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Z-20079/80, IAR-0210/80
Soviet Military Readiness in the
Transcaucasus Military District, USSR (S)
Imagery Analysis Report
Dated September 1980

SUBJECT : Replacement of pages 1 and 2

Please replace pages 1 and 2 of the above-mentioned report with the
attached. Table 1 was modified.

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SOVIET MILITARY READINESS IN THE TRANSCAUCASUS MILITARY DISTRICT, USSR (S)

1. (S/D) Imagery analysis of the military forces deployed in the Transcaucasus region of the USSR has revealed a uniformly higher level of readiness than was evident a year ago. This appears to be the result of positive efforts to improve these forces. An increase in intelligence collection has also resulted in a better understanding of their current posture. This report is a compilation of the imagery-derived aspects of Soviet readiness in this region and is supplemented by tables on command, control, and communications and intelligence (C3I), ground forces, and air forces. Five maps and ten photographs are included in this report.

2. [] Transcaucasus region forces have been assessed by DIA¹ as having the capability to conduct military operations to secure Iranian Azerbaijan but lacking substantial combat support and service support. It has been stated that operations from the Transcaucasus would be preceded by additional, detectable preparations prior to such operations.¹

3. (S/D) Imagery analysis of the military forces in this region has revealed an increased readiness posture over the past year. This increase is attributed to qualitative measures taken by the Soviets to improve forces. NPIC's increased knowledge is also based on improved collection and recent study. Information derived from a comparative study of major Soviet mobilizations since 1968 suggests that all necessary combat, combat support, and service support elements for the initiation of hostilities are present. These forces lack only the apparent signatures of ordered full mobilization (e.g. establishment of mobile communications networks, dispersal of units, field deployment/dispersal of logistics, and infusion of reservists and civilian vehicles into military units).

DESCRIPTION

Command, Control, and Communications and Intelligence

4. (S/D) Observations of mobile and fixed C3I units and facilities (Figure 1) have revealed the presence of the essential sophisticated communications systems/equipment necessary to create a Front-level communications network/system. Table 1 lists the currently known types and locations of advanced mobile electronics equipment identified in the Transcaucasus Military District (MD) since []. The command levels associated with these equipments and the verification dates of presence are also included.

5. (S/D) During the past year, C3I exercise activity (Figures 2 through 5) in this region occurred at all command levels observed. Significant exercises are listed in Table 2. Photographic coverage of the Transcaucasus has increased since the Iranian hostage crisis and the Afghanistan invasion.

6. (S/D) Command and control facilities have been recently identified. A possible command post and government control center for the Georgian SSR has been identified approximately 12 nautical miles north-northwest of Tbilisi at 41-53-15N 044-45-38E. This facility probably performs the same functions as the site identified for the Armenian SSR at Nor Gekhi (). The Georgian facility has been under construction since 1976 and reflects long-term Soviet concern for continuity of government in the Transcaucasus and other regions of the USSR. A probable Soviet Air Force command post has been identified in the same general area (41-50-30N 044-40-50E) and has been established since at least March 1978.

Ground Forces

7. (S/D) Transcaucasus MD ground forces units (Figure 6) received additional and new equipment during the past year. Several organizational changes were also observed. Units at all command levels were observed in training during this timeframe. Combined-arms field training exercises on a large scale were not observed, but the profile of units observed in training indicates active training programs in combat (all levels) units, communications units, air defense troops, diversionary/reconnaissance troops, and non-divisional artillery (Figures 7 through 9). Table 3 lists observed ground forces training exercises (except communications, Table 1).

8. (S/D) Significant qualitative improvements in equipment and organization and basing changes have been observed in frontal, army/corps, and divisional units.

Front-level

- The MD-subordinate motorized rifle division (MRD) at Tbilisi received BMP armored personnel carriers (APCs). It is believed that at least a portion of the BTR-60 APCs remained.
- The AAA division moved from Lagodekhi approximately 20 nm south to Tsteli Tskaro between November 1979 and May 1980.
- Front artillery assets were observed training in the Rustavi Training Area; 240mm self-propelled mortars were involved in this training. These weapons may indicate either the existence of a currently unlocated heavy/high-powered artillery brigade in the MD or the training of a reinforcing unit from the interior MDs/RVGK assets.

(Continued p. 10)

SECRET**Table 1. Advanced Mobile Communications and Electronics Equipment Identified in Transcaucasus MD Since []***This table in its entirety is classified SECRET/WNINTEL.*

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COMMAND LEVEL	Satellite Ground Station*	KH-1	TWIN PAN	R-406	R-412	TWIN EAR	R-410	R-410M	R-136	FIX 24	LGE TALL RODS	DO EL-01	DO EL-05	R-834 P	GER-EL-01 RADAR
(Front/Higher Level)															
Rustavi AL-2	x (Feb 80)			x (May 80)	x (Jun 79)			x (May 80)	x (May 80)						
Tbilisi AL-16	x (Mar 80)	x (Aug 79)							x (Nov 79)						
Tbilisi Tng AR 4	x** (Jun 80)														
Rustavi AL-4	x (Aug 80)			x (Aug 80)											
Tanrykulular AL-1				x (Aug 80)											
Kobi Tropo Sta				x (Aug 80)											
Tbilisi Ord/Mun			x (Jun 80)											x (Jul 80)	
Tbilisi AL-13										x (Aug 79)	x (Mar 80)				
Stepanakert AL-1												x (Jun 79)		x (Jun 79)	
Baku Add/Bnk/Hd	x (Aug 80)			x (Aug 80)	x (Aug 80)		x (Aug 80)								
Sumgait AW Fac***															x (Jul 80)
Army Level															
4 Army Area				x (Aug 80)	x (Aug 80)										
Baku AL-2															
Baku Tng Ar WNW 2							x (Apr 80)	x (May 80)							
Baku-Bingaday				x (May 80)	x (Apr 80)										
Nakhichevan					x (Jun 80)										
7 Army Area															
Yerevan AL-6															
Yerevan AL-9							x (Mar 80)								
Artashat						x (Jul 80)									
31 Corps Area															
Kutaisi AL-8															
Kutaisi AL-7															
Kirovakan M Bks															

*Seen in exercises since 1977

**KH-1 may have moved to Tbilisi Tng Area 4 from Tbilisi AL-10

***Sumgait AW Radar Fac is within the PVO Strany network

Table 2. Number of Observed Exercises*This table in its entirety is classified SECRET/WNINTEL.*

	Gen Staff	Front	Army	Corps	Div	Unsubord
	Aug 80	1		1		
	Jul 80		3	1	2	
	Jun 80		3		1	
	May 80		3	5	2	1
	Apr 80		1	1	1	
	Mar 80		1	1		
	Feb 80		1		1	
	Jan 80				1	
	Dec 79					
	Nov 79		1			
	Oct 79					
	Sep 79					
period prior to increased coverage	Aug 79					1
	Jul 79		1			
	Jun 79		1			